Carbon pricing in dynamic regulation and changing economic environment - agent based model by Aiyegbusi, Olufemi et al.
497 
 
CARBON PRICING IN DYNAMIC REGULATION AND CHANGING 
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT - AGENT BASED MODEL 
 
Olufemi AIYEGBUSI, Rossitsa YALAMOVA, John USHER 
University of Lethbridge, Canada 
olufemi.aiyegbusi@uleth.ca 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Like many industries, the financial services sector increasingly confronts a market environment in which 
both consumers and regulators are anxious to see organizations develop green products and services that 
hold the promise of mitigating environmental degradation and encouraging sustainable use of resources. 
Industry players must therefore be adept at reading demand signals from each of the primary financial 
services sectors (retail banking, corporate and investment banking, asset management, and insurance) 
while also keeping a sharp eye on evolving changes in these highly regulated businesses driven by proactive 
government policies (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Weather derivatives, energy trading and natural 
resource exploration are only few of the sustainability topics vital for the economic future of our province 
(Alberta), and the entire world. Our paper presents an overview of complex adaptive systems and the 
basics of building a model of CAS. We consider CAS to be well suited to the modeling of market 
behavior because it is robust to micro-level behavioral influences and allows the inclusion of heterogeneous 
agents. CAS also offers the possibility of capturing the dynamics of agents experience through features 
such as learning and memory. We present an agent-based model for pricing carbon emissions and results 
of simulations based on Alberta's current data of demand, supply, and regulation of carbon emissions. 
Pricing carbon drives innovation in technologies that improve efficiency, reduce pollution and recognize the 
social cost of business. We analyze the results of simulations in a dynamic framework of changing 
parameters and input variables. 
Keywords: Agent Based Modeling, Carbon Market, Alberta Carbon Trading 
Scheme, Swarm software 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Global warming is a looming threat to our world today- a scary threat that our 
consumption and production habits over many years could doom the earth and 
make it uninhabitable in a few centuries to come. Sea levels are expected to rise, 
weather patterns are likely to change dramatically, frequent extreme weather 
occurrences will likely ensue, agricultural yield will necessarily drop, and some 
organisms in this ecosystem (including humans) are likely to be unable to adapt 
rapidly enough and go extinct. These are just a few of the consequences of 
unbridled global warming trends (Houghton, 1994). If our production and 
consumption processes remain ingrained with practices that heavily emit 
greenhouse gases, it is unlikely that they could be sustained for long. Worse still, by 
continuing on the current path, the world as we know it today may self-destruct. 
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The foregoing underlines the general need for a change in how we live, in order to 
preserve the earth. Practices in manufacturing, agriculture, exploration, and 
transportation especially need to be revised with the aim of reducing their current 
negative externalities. Since industries thrive on energy, this roughly translates to 
the development of alternative energy sources which shall reduce our dependence 
on fossil fuels. The burning of fossil fuels for energy has been identified as the 
heaviest culprit in green house gas emissions. Substituting other methods of energy 
generation should lead us to a cleaner and healthier world. However, this alone has 
proven an inadequate strategy due to limits to the development of technologies 
which efficiently harness these alternative sources. 
Since energy-source substitution on a global scale cannot be an instantaneous 
occurrence, a major complementary strategy which is currently being given profuse 
attention is abatement; which entails the reduction of emissions by the establishment of 
projects which remove greenhouse gases from the atmosphere. The main focus of this 
approach is on carbon emissions which account for about 90% of total green house gas 
emissions (US Gov, 2006). These projects are expected to be paid for ultimately by 
emitters, who shall be required to buy up chunks of them in order to continue 
producing after exceeding their allotted emissions limit (Stavins, 2008). This added cost 
of production may itself discourage excessive emissions and encourage firms to develop 
better emissions-efficient processes and technology- thereby speeding up the process of 
achieving more sustainable habits in pursuit of an inhabitable future. 
The strategy adumbrated on above is our broad concern in this study. In 
particular, how this framework that makes industry responsible for the social cost 
of its carbon emission-inefficient practices, can be optimally operationalized is our 
main focus. The current global trend is to execute this framework through markets 
where those chunks (defined as emissions credits) are sold at prices determined by 
market forces. These markets are burgeoning by the year, and starting to evolve 
from amorphous setups into more developed structures with the advent of 
stimulating global regulations and national policies (Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008). 
However, their form can hardly be understood through existing traditional market 
models given their evolutionary nature which evades the many assumptions 
intrinsic to traditional economic theory. Models imbued with more realism (perhaps 
at the cost of tractability) seem necessary if we are to understand the dynamic 
workings within these markets.  
Our paper presents an overview of complex adaptive systems (CAS) and the 
basics of building a model of CAS. We present an agent-based model for pricing 
carbon emissions and results of simulations based on Alberta's current data of 
demand, supply, and regulation of carbon emissions. Pricing carbon drives 
innovation in technologies that improves efficiency and reduces pollution. We 
analyze the results of simulations in a dynamic framework of changing parameters 
and input variables. Agent-based modeling and complexity research methods aid in 
tackling problems related to economics and climate change, provide quantitative data 
for assessment of policy, and regulate intended results in a complex dynamic 
framework. We aim by this study, to provide a starting point in model building by 
constructing a simple model that captures some salient realities about the agents, 
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environment and dynamics of interactions within the Alberta Carbon Market. We 
hope to have also built a model that shall be robust to mutations over time and that 
shall prove adaptable to other similar financial markets. In terms of practical gains, we 
also hope to have gained an understanding of what types of structures and regulatory 
policies could aid stability and healthy buoyancy of prices within this market. 
In what follows, we give a brief background on agent based models, followed by 
a description of the Alberta carbon market. In the third section, we describe our 
proposed model and explicate on its peculiarities. We also discuss preliminary 
observations and our expectations from future simulations. The concluding section 
considers the gains, limitations to the study and areas in which the model could be 
improved in future studies. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Agent based models 
The modeling approach proposed for this study is one which is sensitive to the 
complexity inherent to the study of markets. Previously, economic researches of 
markets have been based on reductionist assumptions in pursuit of tractability. In 
particular, such models assume homogeneity of agents, i.e. homo economicus – the 
rational utility seeker – and thereby discount the full behavioral diversity of human 
motivation. While this has been helpful in gaining enlightenment on how diverse 
variables are related when isolated, the resultant theories have often been 
confounded by the realities suggested by empirical time-series data (Campbell, 2000). 
A very plausible explanation for these deviations may be that reductionism assumes 
away the complex realities of interactions among variables (in a model) and also 
ignores the underlying dynamics of interactions among economic units. 
Based on this line of thought, a growing army of researchers have in more recent 
times turned attention to the study of complex systems. Fortunately, this school 
which embodies both a philosophy and specific techniques has been burgeoning with 
the development in sophistication of methods for exploring complex phenomena in 
other fields such as biology, computing and information technology. Today, these 
evolving methods which were born in other fields are being applied and adapted to 
the meaningful study of macroeconomic phenomena as well. 
Agent based modeling is a technique for modeling complex phenomenon. 
Classical econometric models have failed over time to explain trends in real-world 
data (Mitchell, 2009; Campbell, 2000). Perhaps this stems from the fact that 
econometric models like most positivist models, assume a reductionist stance to 
problem solving (Descartes, 1637/2006). Econometric models assume macro-level 
behavior without consideration of how that behavior is generated. Such neglect 
may be trivial for static systems, but becomes costly when the system or unit being 
studied has a dynamic and adaptive nature.  
Real economies are adaptive, and markets evolve over time. Classical economics 
(upon which econometric models are built) often attributes this evolution to 
exogenous factors. In reality, a market may evolve due to the interaction of factors 
within itself apart from exogenous influences. This is the logic underlying agent 
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based modeling; the parts together may yield behavior that greatly differs from the 
anticipated behavior of their additive whole, and the explanation of macro-behavior 
may well be hidden within the dynamics of micro-level interactions of constituent 
units (Beinhocker, 2006). While this is true in most complex phenomenon, it is most 
obvious during bubbles and crashes. 
Therefore, in order to capture the complexity of market behavior rather than 
making assumptions a priori, agent-based modeling simulates the behavior of many 
heterogeneous units which interact to define the market. This intuitively has a 
greater chance of achieving a tight fit with real world data than a simplistic model 
based on assumptions built on an ideal world (Axelrod, 1997). As outlined by 
Bonabeau (2002), agent based modeling yields promise when non-linear relationships 
are likely to subsist, agents are deemed heterogeneous in their interactions, averages 
are not reliable, and individual agents exhibit behavior such as memory, learning 
and adaptation in the system of interest. The Carbon trading market shows signs of 
all these features and so seems a great candidate for agent based modeling. 
Carbon trading as a concept is relatively new. It dates only as far back as 1997 
(Kollmuss et al., 2010). Even so, the formal adoption of the Kyoto protocol 
subsequent to the Kyoto convention has been very slow. In Canada, it is still a very 
young and underdeveloped market. Thus, rich data such as time series or panel data 
are scarce. Due to the fact that many countries are yet to incorporate actual 
frameworks or policies, the market also does not exist in many countries. Thus, 
even cross-sectional data is scarce. This lack of data is one reason why agent based 
modeling is well suited for this study. By simulating data, it is hoped that we can 
understand the dynamics of the market despite not having had the market for an 
adequately long period of time and across diverse countries. 
A related but equally compelling reason for employing this modeling technique 
is the evolutionary nature of the market. Agent-based modeling easily lends itself to 
simulations of evolutionary systems (Axelrod, 1986) due to its micro-level 
development. It allows for building in adaptive agents who themselves evolve to 
define a dynamically evolving market. It shall also illuminate our understanding of 
the relative importance of small differences in initial conditions on short, medium 
and long-run outcomes. Consequently, concepts such as information, memory and 
learning can be incorporated into micro-level behavior, and the effects of these on 
the quality of the market can be analyzed.  
Past efforts in market modeling using an agent-based approach have mainly 
focused on the stock markets. Among these, the research styles range from purely 
analytic to heavily computational (LeBaron, 1995). Analytic studies such as Kelley 
(1956) and Friedman (1953) presented arguments which emphasized the role of 
agent heterogeneity in strategies and ultimate survival within an economic 
environment. Figlewski (1978) examined heterogeneity within the context of wealth 
dynamics and specifically considered how wealth dynamics affects the convergence 
of a market to efficiency. More recently, Bossaerts (1994) discovered that the speed 
of the learning process of different agents can have significant effects on the 
stationarity of financial time series data. All these demonstrate diverse aspects of 
the role that heterogeneity may play in market outcomes. 
Regional and Business Studies Vol 3 Suppl 1 
 501
Computational models have witnessed an upsurge in numbers and variety in recent 
times. Drawing on recent developments in artificial intelligence and computing 
science, modern approaches such as genetic algorithms (GA), classifiers, and neural 
networks have been applied to financial problems in addition to more traditional 
methods such as least squares learning. LeBaron (1995) advocates that the main 
prerequisite to determining the appropriate computational technique for a given 
study is having precise knowledge of: “what domain the agents knowledge lies in; 
what types of equilibria lie in that domain; and how agents move in this domain by 
updating beliefs” (p. 2).  
Lettau (1993), Arifovic (1996), and Routledge (1994), employ the use of well-defined 
simple economic models which focus on learning as a tool to explore both stability 
and evolution of markets within genetic algorithmic frameworks. These frameworks 
are generally less open in structure relative to neural networks such as that used by 
Beltratti and Margarita (1992), and classifier based systems used by Marengo and Tordjman 
(1995). In generally, these studies found scenarios in which the markets do not settle 
down to equilibrium for long due to agent heterogeneity in terms of risk-attitude, 
information quality and accessibility, network-types and memory. 
Perhaps the most extensive agent-based market simulation to date, the Santa Fe 
Stock Market attempts to fuse a well-defined market trading mechanism structure 
with an inductive-learning oriented classifier based system (Arthur et al, 1997). This 
study shall lean on the logic of the techniques employed by the Santa Fe Stock 
Market in building a simple evolutionary model with specific applicability to the 
carbon-trading market. 
 
The Alberta carbon market 
Carbon-trading markets have recently sprung up in many developed countries- 
subsequent to the Kyoto protocol which enlists it as one of the major abatement 
strategies for economies. The Alberta emissions trading scheme is one of such 
responses which was effectively created in July 2007 by legislation (Alberta 
Environment, 2008). Its main objective is to regulate the emission of large emitters by 
determining an efficient price on emission, which will tend to reduce emissions 
without crippling the productivity of firms. The Large emitters- numbering about 100 
corporations- are defined as those corporations which exceed 100,000mtCO2e in 
emissions per annum (Alberta Environment, 2007). They are required by statute to 
reduce this by 12% every year from 2007 to 2014 calculated with a baseline of 2003-
2005 (Specified Gas Emitters Regulation, 2003). The top 30 emitters were responsible for 
about 87 percent of total emissions in 2006 (Goddard et al., 2008). This implies a non-
normal distribution where the demand side in the market is likely to be dominated by 
a strong minority with very large demand size. This reality further justifies the 
adoption of a complexity-oriented methodology which makes no rigid assumptions 
about the underlying distributions in the market. With agent based modeling, the 
effect of power laws in ensuing interactions can also be recognized. 
The Alberta scheme, while sharing many similarities with other emissions 
trading schemes, is different in a few ways. It is planned as a closed market. The 
market is administered by government with a stakeholder-based approach to 
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decision-making and planning. Alberta statute recognizes only offset projects 
executed within Alberta (Kollmuss et al, 2010). Also, only Alberta-raised credits can 
be surrendered for compliance purposes by regulated Alberta companies. However, 
a leakage may exist in future if players from other markets are able to purchase 
credits from the market in order to meet compliance in their own environment. 
This may lead to an exogenous hike in the prices of credits. Currently, this is not 
the case. Non-Alberta corporations seem to be restrained from this incursion either 
because the markets are still emerging (information issues), compliance is yet to 
become strict, prices are not sufficiently low (especially when transaction costs are 
factored in), or because their own local regulations are still fuzzy. 
There are two types of carbon credit recognized by the provincial government- 
Emissions performance credits, and Alberta-based offset credits (Alberta 
Environment, 2011). An alternative method with which a firm could buy up rights to 
pollute beyond stipulated thresholds include- Climate change and emissions 
management fund (CCEM). Also, corporations could improve their operations in 
order to consume within the statutory level stipulated. 
 
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND DISCUSSION 
 
Agents 
By definition, agents in every market can be broadly classified into two groups; 
buyers (the demand side) and sellers (the supply side). The Alberta Carbon market, 
despite having several players active in it conforms to this functional classification. 
From the Specified Gas Emitters Regulation (Alberta Environment, 2011), we can 
clearly identify the buyers as including large regulated emitters who require the 
carbon credits for compliance. These large emitters are a hundred in number and 
they all fall into the regulation cadre due to their emissions being in excess of 
100mtCO2e per annum. In order to engender realism, the same numbers of large 
emitters are recognized in our model. It is noteworthy however, that this is not a 
homogenous group, since 30% of these large emitters is responsible for over 80% 
of total emissions (Goddard et al, 2008). The behavior of this top 30 is likely to be 
different from and have more impact on the market than that of the lower 70. Also 
there will be some of these emitters who will be able to develop emissions-efficient 
technology easier and thus save on cost of credits. These details on heterogeneity 
shall prove resourceful as the model gains sophistication. 
In addition, apart from regulated firms, it is possible that traders will be allowed 
over time who intermediate in the market on behalf of investors and speculators (as 
is obtainable in stock markets). Their behavior is likely to differ meaningfully from 
that of large emitters who need credits as inputs for production. Our model 
includes 20 of such position traders who predict the medium to long term 
profitability of carbon credits based on adaptive expectations.  
We start with a very simple premise that each agent has an objective function 
which it attempts to optimize subject to some constraint. From the preceding 
paragraph, we established the (non-exhaustive) existence of two major types of 
buyers- large emitters, and traders. We assume that they each attempt to optimize 
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as follows; emitters minimize expenditure on credits subject to production targets 
while traders maximize profit gained by trading credits. The optimization task for 
traders will incorporate their forecasts and changing strategies due to learning and 
memory. The emitters in our model minimize their cost subject to their production 
function, that is; 
 Minimize: C = Pc C + Pe E (1) 
 Subject to: Q = Ca Eb (2) 
Where C = Cost function 
 Pc = Price of a unit of carbon credit 
 Pe = Price of a unit of the CCEM 
 C = Quantity of credits used as inputs 
 E = Quantity of CCEM used as inputs 
 a & b = Elasticities of substitution for both inputs 
We assume the Cobb-Douglas production function for simplicity. We also assume 
that emitters differ in their returns to scale based on size, with the largest 30 
experiencing decreasing returns to scale (a + b < 1), while the remaining 70 enjoy 
increasing returns to scale (a + b > 1). Thus, as modeled, emitters buy just as much 
credits as necessary to produce their cost minimizing level of output. For example, 
if price of credits were to increase (ceteris paribus), they will choose to purchase 
more of CCEM to the extent that their cost minimizing goal is achieved. These 
functions feed into their individual demand functions to determine their behavior 
as the demand side of the market. 
We use very simple heuristics to design traders assume for simplicity that only 
momentum traders exist within the market. They simply make their choice to buy 
when they foresee that prices will be higher in a future period by which they could 
sell and earn a profit. Specifically, momentum traders forecast of transaction price 
of credit in the next period is denoted as: 
 Pt+1 = 1/N [ ∑Pt-n( Pt-n /Pt-n-1) ] (3) 
Where n = 0,…,4 is the number of lags in periods 
 Pt = Price in the current period 
 N = number of items summed  
As indicated, we allow n to vary between 0 and 4 while setting N = 5 thus keeping 
the forecast as a function of the 5 year moving average of credit prices. 
Sellers on the other hand were indicated to include- the unregulated industrial sector 
(facilities emitting below 100mtCO2e/yr), regulated corporations, the agricultural sector, 
and project developers (Alberta Environment, 2011). In order not to complicate the 
model excessively, we assume that regulated companies cannot sufficiently reduce their 
emissions to the level that they can earn credits which they resell. Companies within the 
unregulated industrial sector may raise credits by reducing their emissions for instance 
and sell those credits earned to the regulated corporations. Their goal will be to 
maximize earnings from sales of credits subject to the constraints of their costs and 
emissions-reduction capacity. In essence, unregulated firms have a carbon credit supply 
curve that is a function of changes in their scale of production, level of accessible 
technology, and the market price for credits. 
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That is; 
 QSc = f (∆Q, T, Pc) (4) 
A firm which increases its scale of production for instance, has to either reduce its 
supply of credits to the carbon market or access a higher level of carbon efficient 
technology in order to maintain its previous supply levels. Similarly, the price of 
credits acts as an incentive to firms if by selling such credits, they are likely to make 
more profit than by increasing their production levels. Unregulated firms as 
designed in our model, adopt a very basic forecast and shortsighted heuristic;  
Pt+1 = Pt (Pt / Pt-1) (where Pt = Price of credits in current period) in which price in 
the next period is a function of price in the current period and the previous period. 
The agricultural sector and project developers which are directly involved in 
abatement projects (such as carbon sequestration) shall seek to maximize their 
earnings from credits subject to the cost of those abatement projects. Thus they 
face a supply curve of the form; 
 QSc = f (Pt+1/ Cp) (5) 
Where Cp = Cost of the project per unit of realizable credit 
 QSc = Quantity of carbon credits supplied to the market 
If Pt+1 / Cp ≤ 1; No profit is made, no developer wants to participate in an 
ungainful market and supply QSc = 0 
If Pt+1 / Cp > 1, Profit is made, and QSc varies directly with the level of profit. 
Their function is similar to that of traders but differs in that a 10 year moving 
average is used rather than the 5 year variant (i.e. N = 10). This follows intuitively 
from the fact that projects are often highly capital intensive and take a while to 
implement. Also, agricultural and project developers have a lower threshold for risk 
than traders, and so attempt to access more information by longer memory. 
Finally as can be expected, traders also feature on the supply side by employing 
the previously discussed forecast heuristic; they take positions based on anticipated 
trends and sell to the market if they anticipate a possibility of making a spread or 
cutting a loss. Typically, traders in the model sell whenever current price exceeds 
the price at which they bought, provided prices are expected to take on a decline. 
Our agents all exhibit behavior as defined by objective functions very much unlike 
the agents in Gode and Sunder (1993), which employ “zero intelligence” budget 
constrained agents because agents in their model are not capable of learning or 
adaptation (their study is more concerned with institutional dynamics). Other studies 
have modeled agents based on trading rules without any objective functions, but these 
achieve simplicity at the cost of stifling the evolution of new strategies. Agents in our 
model are more similar to those described by Levy et al. (1994), Arifovic (1996), and 
especially with Arthur et al. (1997) which incorporate forecasts of future prices into their 
agents’ decision making framework. Future models are likely to improve on this agent 
specification by allowing for variability of inter-temporal optimization plans. 
 
Trading Mechanism 
In the absence of the convenience afforded by equilibrium modeling, it becomes 
necessary to specify the process through which trading occurs and by which the 
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proposed market clears. Agent based markets mostly handle the clearing problem 
either; by assuming that price simply adjusts to excess demand, by constructing a 
market in which temporary equilibrium prices easily subsist or by explicitly modeling 
trading in a continuous form as prevalent in actual markets (LeBaron, 2001).  
For our purpose, the second method seems most appropriate. Demand 
functions of agents are likely to be reasonably well behaved since the carbon market 
is unlikely to yield high-frequency price dynamics given its nature. The first method 
is fast and acknowledges perpetual disequilibrium in the market but requires the 
artificial inclusion of a market maker (Farmer and Joshi, 2001), while assuming 
constant market depth (LeBaron, 2001). The third method seems most appealing 
with respect to its high level of realism, but is unlikely to be worth the cost in 
efforts outside high-frequency market applications. 
 
Traded Commodity 
The Alberta provincial government recognizes two types of carbon credits- 
Emissions Performance Credits, and Alberta-based offset credits (Alberta 
Environment, 2011). In addition, firms could substitute the CCEM which is currently 
priced at a flat rate of $15 per unit of emissions. The pricing of the CCEM thus 
effectively functions as a price ceiling for credits. 
Unlike stock market models which frequently have a risk-free commodity and a risky 
one between which traders choose, the carbon market necessarily incorporates this 
choice only for traders and project developers. The choice for regulated firms precludes 
this risk free option since they require the credits for compliance, but includes the 
CCEM. To enhance simplicity, we consider the two types of credits as one type from 
two sources. Therefore for the purpose of this study, we consider both performance 
credits and offset credits as identical commodities- simply called carbon credits. 
Our commodities also differ from the stock market variants in their fundamental 
nature. Traders in the stock market often read signals from announcements regarding 
the fundamentals (such as dividends or earnings) of securities. In fact, their forecasts 
are mostly a function of these. Carbon credits lack this signaling facility from 
fundamentals. Thus price forecasts are likely to be made mostly based on 
expectations of demand for those credits by regulated firms, relative to supply. 
Frugality in the number of included commodities is important because the 
heterogeneity of agents itself presents complexities (both analytical and 
computational) which may be difficult to study in the mire of many commodities. 
 
Calibration/Validation 
Validation of this simulation is likely to present certain hurdles which are likely to 
diminish over time. As suggested by LeBaron (2001), validation could be achieved 
through calibration of parameters with certain benchmark cases which converge into 
a well defined homogenous agent equilibrium. Unfortunately, this type of data is as 
yet unavailable in actual carbon markets which are quite new and just emerging. Over 
time, calibration will likely become feasible as the market matures. 
Being an exploratory study of the carbon market, our main claim to validation is 
in avoiding the introduction of features which are not apparent or likely to be 
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evident in the actual carbon market into our model. This representativeness, while 
not being adequate validation, does give some credibility to our findings. We expect 
that future studies will be better equipped with the relevant data sets for calibration. 
 
Evolution 
Evolution is at the core of agent based modeling. When agents interact among 
themselves in a market, each seeks to maximize certain objectives by using specific 
strategies. Strategies compete in the marketplace, and intuition suggests that over 
time the less-competitive strategies will be squeezed out. This means that agents 
will abandon those strategies and not necessarily that they will themselves be 
pushed out of the market. This seems a more realistic expectation than the 
argument by traditional economic theory (See Friedman, 1953) which focuses on the 
agents themselves rather than their strategies. 
As these strategies interact in the marketplace and the less-competitive ones get 
weeded out, it is likely that the surviving ones may be combined and mixed in the bid 
for superior strategies. Once these hybrids are born, they again contest with existing 
strategies, and again the weaker strategies in the market get weeded out. The process 
continues over time and may be influenced by the intermittent entry of entirely new 
strategies which also strive for survival. This process describes the kind of evolution 
that exists in actual markets and is very likely to prevail in carbon markets.  
This perspective of evolution as a mutation of strategies rather than in terms of 
rational/irrational traders allows for an intelligible representation of learning among 
agents (LeBaron, 2001). Perhaps within the stock markets, rationality may be fruitful 
bases for exploration. However since the agents in our model have heterogeneous goals 
and not all are traders (which are reasonably classified based on rationality), irrational 
agents are likely to exist. As such, “irrational” agents as described by Blume and Easley 
(1990) may be favored by the market, especially where power laws have a strong pull.  
Our agents evolve their strategies based on risk attitudes and past performance 
of strategies. We make no prior assumptions about which strategies are rational and 
which are not. As identified by Kyle and Wang (1997), we also expect that certain 
evolutionary pressures may cause the market to favor agents that are excessively 
risk-seeking in the long run. We expect that changing the rate at which strategies are 
updated alone will significantly influence market mutations. 
A key related concept is memory. Trading agents are modeled to vary in their 
memory lengths. Price forecasts which are a basis for strategies are made partly as a 
function of previous prices. Agents differ in the extent to which they remember prices- 
some have much longer memories than others. Some agents may also perceive only 
more recent information as being relevant to decision making. We incorporate this 
feature as well into our model to allow for an evolutionary market with realistic agents. 
 
SOFTWARE 
 
Due to its flexibility and accessibility, Netlogo 4.1.3 is the software chosen for the 
purpose of this study. Apart from being built to ease the technical difficulty 
inherent to simultaneous simulation of activities of agents within a system, it also 
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affords a comprehensive user guide which most other relevant software such as 
Repast and Swarm lack. Thus, its codes are much more accessible and easier to 
learn. These advantages are further accentuated by the software’s 2-Dimensional 
graphical interface. 
Using Netlogo 4.1.3, we ran two separate preliminary simulations for this study; 
one representing the very tame market (without traders), and the second one with 
traders introduced. We also ran the simulations for 100 periods each. The primary 
aim of implementing two runs was to tease out the influence of traders on efficient 
price determination. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have explored issues relevant to building an agent based model of 
the nascent carbon market in Alberta. We have also specified some details about 
the proposed model. As the simulation aspect of the modeling progresses, we hope 
to uncover more pertinent issues. We hope that these shall prove useful in 
envisaging likely issues that may evolve in the carbon market in future. 
One major finding in our preliminary simulation was that the inclusion of 
traders into the model prevented the market from reaching equilibrium during the 
100- period span, while equilibrium was attained within the first 48 periods of the 
tame market. The traders being momentum traders by design kept the market 
spinning out of perceivable tendencies towards equilibrium with wild oscillations in 
price and traded volumes. Prices were almost always higher relative to the tame 
market, while a higher volume of credits were traded than in the tame model. 
Generally, while being very premature to conclude as yet, the trial runs suggest that 
traders may be a positive influence on the market in terms of price buoyancy, but 
may greatly increase volatility within the market. The increase in traded volumes 
may have been due to increased liquidity brought into the market by traders. The 
higher prices are likely indicative of noise brought by the traders into the market.  
However, more evidence is required before a conclusion can be reasonably drawn. 
It shall also be useful to compare prices in subsequent runs in our simulation 
with equilibriums that could be expected given a rational expectations formulation 
of forecasts. It will be interesting for instance to know whether the wild market 
converges to a rational expectations equilibrium as similar to that reported by Plott 
and Sunder (1982), in their human experiment. 
Subsequently, the software shall be used to run simulations in which the 
assumption that only momentum traders exist (implicit in the trader’s forecast 
mechanism) is relaxed. Furthermore, future simulations shall vary the number and 
proportion of traders and also toggle the proportion relative to other supply side 
agents and emitters. Also an extension of periods beyond 100 may reveal eventual 
long-run equilibrium, even in the trader-inclusive model. 
As yet, calibration of the model is a hurdle which we hope will become 
surmountable with the development of the market and growth of trade datasets; this 
will enable more rigorous empirical exploration. This does not however detract from 
the dividends that this analytical inquiry promises to regulators, and other stake holders. 
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